The knowledge gap hypothesis introduced into the mass communication literature in 1970 by Tichenor, Donohue , and Olien appears to have important implications for the use of the mass media as a constructive social tool. The hypothesis as originally formulated asserts that &dquo;as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase&dquo; (Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, 1970: 159) . The hypothesis thus implies that attempts to equalize the distribution of information within a social system which employ the mass media are bound not only to fail, but actually to increase the inequality.
This implication has been of interest to students of both developing and developed societies, and a body of literature [180] concerning knowledge gaps and other &dquo;communication effects gaps&dquo; in both sorts of societies has begun to emerge. But while the implications of the knowledge gap hypothesis for social policy may seem clear, the evidence bearing on the hypothesis found in this literature is less clear. The original formulation of the knowledge gap hypothesis, for example, was supported by Tichenor and his associates (1970) (Budd, Maclean, . and Bames, 1966) . This finding, however, can be balanced against another news diffusion study ( Larson and Hills, 1954) which found that slightly more people in a working-class neighborhood heard of the event than people in a professional neighborhood. A later study by Tichenor and his associates (1973) reports that in a number of smaller communities increased newspaper coverage of a national news item was associated with a gap in knowledge of that item, while increased coverage of local items was not associated with a gap.
Data from developing societies have shown the same mixed results. For example, Galloway (1974) (1974) has pieced together historical data showing that the gap between husbands (information-rich) and wives (information-poor) in ability to write their own names widened and then narrowed over long peri ods of time.
These results suggest that before the knowledge gap hypothesis and its implications for both more and less developed societies can serve as useful inputs for policy development, it will be necessary to elaborate and perhaps modify the hypothesis to account for the results reviewed above. Specifically, it will be necessary to specify the conditions in which an infusion [181] of mass media information into a social system will widen the gap (Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien, 1975; Genova, 1975) Katzman (1974) , who is concerned with gaps between those with more and less knowledge rather than between higher and lower SES population segments, offers a similar list which includes differences in communication skills due to differences in education, differences in ability to make use of new information due to differences in the individual's existing knowledge, differences in access to new communications technology due to differences in financial resources, and differences in motivation to use communication resources.
Other authors focus on a single factor in attempting to predict or explain their results. For example, Cooke et al. (1975) , in their reanalysis of the &dquo;Sesame Street&dquo; summative evaluation data, emphasize differences in exposure between higher and lower SES children as the explanation of the modest gap-widening effects they found. Genova (1975) demonstrates that differences in interest in (or salience of) a news event on the part of the audience can produce knowledge gap effects at least under some circumstances. Galloway (1974) emphasizes the social contact factor first advanced by Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970) in his argument that gaps widen when discussion of the innovation is limited to the more advantaged &dquo;substructures&dquo; within the social system.
Galloway also suggests that the social contacts factor can account for narrowing gaps when discussion cuts across substructures. This notion is based on the attempt by Tichenor and his associates (Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien, 1975) to explain to complex results of the earlier study (Tichenor, Roden- kirchen, Olien, and Donohue, 1973) , in which the gap narrowed for local information but widened for national information. The authors argue that mass media information is more likely to narrow knowledge gaps when the knowledge domain under study is salient and conflict-ridden within a community, particularly a homogeneous (i.e., small) community. The effect of salience and conflict is attributed to an equalization of motivation to acquire the knowledge across all segments of the community, while the effect of homogeneity is attributed to the decreased differentiation between the segments resulting in increased interpersonal discussion of the information between the segments. The authors offer data in support of these arguments.
With the important exception of this work by Tichenor and his associates and Galloway's extension of it, the narrowing of gaps is attributed to &dquo;ceiling effects.&dquo; Shingi and Mody (1976: 185), for example, concluded that the information-poor farmers may have caught up to the information-rich farmers because &dquo;the more informationally rich farmers encountered a 'ceiling effect' in that they already knew much of the content of the two television programs.&dquo; Galloway (1974) comes to a similar conclusion. The data cited in Katzman's article also imply that a ceiling effect is responsible for a gap-narrowing, since the [183] criteria for measuring the gap (i.e., ability of husbands and wives to write their own name) has an inherent ceiling (i.e., successfully writing one's name) beyond which change is not measured. (Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, 1970; Tichenor, Rodenkirchen, Olien, and Donohue, 1973) rather than the difference between those with more and less information (Katzman, 1974) . We will also ignore, for the most part, [184] In the fields of education and child development, Cole and Bruner (1971) (Quay, 1974; I reton, Thriving, and Graven, 1970; Willerman, Broman, and Fiedler, 1970) .
A good deal of research has been di rected toward specifying the causes of the &dquo;achievement gap&dquo; and toward developing plans to narrow it Cole and Bruner (1971: 867) (Bernstein, 1961: 164) . The language used by higher SES persons, on the other hand, is &dquo;rich in personal, individual qualifications and its form implies sets of advanced logical operations&dquo; (Bernstein, 1961: 164) . Pursuing this line of reasoning, Deutsch (1965) argues that this language deficiency is translated into cognitive deficiency-so that the more complex and abstract the task required of the lower SES child, the greater his deficit. Deutsch concludes that this deficiency in cognitive competence combines with the other disadvantages of lower SES life throughout the child's development to produce a &dquo;cumulative deficit.&dquo; Such deficit theorizing was instrumental in the development of the intervention schemes based on intellectual stimulation of the child at an early age, as exemplified by the federally-sponsored Head Start programs.
The alternative presented by Cole and Bruner ( 1971: 870) is the &dquo;difference interpretation&dquo;:
The aux of the argument ... is that those groups ordinarily diagnosed as culturally deprived have the same underlying competence as those in the mainstream of the dominant culture, the difference in performance being accounted for by the situations and con tex ts in which the competence is expressed.
In support of the difference interpretation, Cole and Bruner cite the work of Labov (1970) , who attacks the concept of linguistic deficiency. An example of Labov's approach related by Cole and Bruner is a language assessment interview of an eight-year-old black child in which the child is first interviewed in a standardized but apparently nonthreatening manner (e.g., black neighborhood figure is used as interviewer) and is shown. to be monosyllabic and, thus, linguistically deficient. Later, however, the child is reinterviewed by the same interviewer but in the child's own apartment, lying on the floor, eating snacks, using black dialect and discussing clearly taboo subjects. In this situation the child becomes an active participant in the conversation. From these and other examples produced by Labov, it is concluded that &dquo;the usual assessment situations, including IQ and reading tests, elicit deliberate, defensive [187] behavior on the part of the child who has realistic expectations that to talk openly is to expose oneself to insult end harm. As a consequence, such situations cannot measure the child's competence&dquo; (Cole and Bruner, 1971: 869) .
Another important line of evidence offered in support of the difference interpretation is cross-cultural studies of cognitive abilities. An (Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien, 1975 ) that salience and conflict may have narrowed the gap in local public affairs knowledge through an equalization of motivation to acquire the information.
Turning now to the more general task of conceptualizing the causes of knowledge gap phenomena, the arguments presented by Cole and Bruner maintain that the explanation of SESrelated disparities in knowledge lies not in transituational deficits, but rather in situation-specific differences between higher and lower SES persons. The communication skills factor cited by Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970) ( 1970) and others may be cast into a difference interpretation. [191] The selective exposure and retention factor (Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, 1970 ) is one such causal factor which may be readily incorporated into a difference interpretation. SESrelated differences in media exposure (in terms of both amount of exposure to various media and content preferences) are well documented in the mass communication literature (see, for example, Dervin and Greenberg, 1972) , and similar differences in retention of information have also been reported (e.g., Williams and Lindsay, 1971) . Thus, differences in exposure and/or retention could explain the widening of gaps, as Cooke et al. (1975) has argued is true in the case of &dquo;Sesame Street.&dquo; These differences, however, in turn, require explanations, and the answer could well be differences in motivation to acquire the information. The status of selective exposure and retention in the difference interpretation is that of intervening variables linking motivation and function to rate of knowledge acquisition.
Another factor which fits readily into the difference interpretation in much the same way is differences in social contacts relevant to the topic under study (Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, 1970) . It is not that lower SES persons lack social contacts in general, for indeed they do not (Dervin and Greenberg, 1972) , but, as Chaffee (1972) generalizes, &dquo;likes talk to likes&dquo; (see also Troldahl and Van Dam, 1965 (Atkin, 1973; Fett, 1975) may indicate something about the function of information under various circumstances; and research on alienation may shed light on the motivation to [193] acquire certain types of information, such as public affairs (Seeman, 1966; Nielson, 1973) . Of course, other disciplines (e.g., Hess, 1970, in developmental psychology; Moynihan, 1969, and Shostak, 1969, in ( 1970, 1973) , or why that sort of information would be more functional for them. It is reasonable to expect, then, that widening gaps will be found in the knowledge domain of public affairs unless something intervenes to alter the motivation and/or function patterns, and Tichenor and his associates (Donohue et al., 1975) argue that in regard to the local public affairs information they studied, this is exactly what did happen: the importance of the issues for the small towns was so great that persons from all social strata were motivated to acquire information on those issues.3 3 Genova's (1975) work, which shows that differences in interest in (or the salience of) the knowledge domain on the part of the audience may produce knowledge gaps between more and less interested persons, also fits well into the difference interpretation. Genova did not, however, actively pursue the problem of linking differences in interest to SES which would be necessary for this analysis to directly bear on the difference interpretation as outlined here.
This difference interpretation may also serve as a useful heuristic device for exploration of knowledge gap phenomena. For example, Torsvik (1972) has reported data showing a narrowing of a knowledge gap in national public affairs information after the introduction of television into three northern Norwegian provinces. Specifically, his data (Table 1) show that the less educated Norwegians who acquired television between 1965 and 1969 showed a larger increase in knowledge [194] [196] congruent with a preconceived notion of political life chances. [Jennings and Langton, 1968: 864] The authors provide data showing that black students whose parents have less education felt more politically efficacious, were more interested in politics, and talked more about it if they had taken a civics course as compared to students who had more education. Table 2 ) and, thus, act to decrease the Katzman (1974) concerning the ability of husbands and wives to write their names. In this case, the knowledge domain (which Katzman refers as the &dquo;criteria&dquo; for measuring the gap) is writing one's name and has a true ceiling which is simply the fully developed . ability or knowledge of how to do so. The data, then, may be explained by the fact that when the husbands had learned to write their name, they had reached the true ceiling of the [199] 
SUMMARY
In terms of specifying the conditions in which gaps will widen and those in which they will narrow, we have argued that it may be necessary to specify (1) the distribution across social strata of the motivation to acquire the information under study and/or the degree to which that information is functional for various social strata, and (2) the presence or absence of ceilings derived from the message, the knowledge domain, or the audience itself. For the present, there must remain only possibilities, subject to verification by research which is yet to be done.
In terms of the more general task of developing a theory of knowledge gap phenomena, we have identified three categories of possible causal factors: (1) transituational deficits (e.g., lack of communication skills), (2) differences in distribution of motivation to acquire the information under study and/or the degree to which that information is functional for various social strata, and (3) ceilings of which two theoretically important types have been distinguished (imposed and true ceilings). These are not mutually exclusive explanations of gap phenomena; rather, all three or any combination of them are potentially the causes of any particular gap situation. This suggests that a theory of knowledge gap phenomena will have at least three parameters which must be estimated to predict gap phenomena.
